

The State and Social Media Abroad:
International Political Sociology & The 'Blurring' of Who\What Governs Foreign Policy

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction	4
Preface	8

SECTION ONE

I. Foreign Policy Literature Review	12
II. Governmentality	17
III. The 'Foreign Policy Assemblage'	22
Part One: 'Assemblage' at a Glance	23
Part Two: Emergence & Coalescing of Interests	25
Part Three: Component Parts	28
IV. Bio(political) Power	39

SECTION TWO

V. The 'Blurring' of Who\What Governs Foreign Policy	48
A: Governmentality	48
B: The 'Foreign Policy Assemblage'	50
C: Bio(political) Power	52
VI. Social Media's Political Space	56
VII. Conclusion	63

To what extent does the relationship between the state and social media play a constitutive role in foreign policy? How does this relationship consequently blur foreign policy's lines of governance? The ongoing development and global proliferation of information and communication technology (ICT) and the private interests that tend to control them is having increasingly significant impacts on state foreign policy. However, little debate and discussion has arisen within conventional foreign policy literatures regarding these developments, particularly the extent to which they impact the maintenance of security interests through U.S. foreign policy. An examination of the relationship between the state and social media reveals attempts by the state's foreign policy bureaucracy to utilize mobile, social networking technologies as surveillance mechanisms in the name of 'state security', as in order to advance biopolitical mechanisms of control around the globe. However, as the state pursues social media actors, understandings of who or what is actually governing foreign policy becomes 'blurred'. The paper looks to various logics and understandings offered by International Political Sociology (IPS) in order to both account for the state's pursuit of social media actors abroad, and how IPS' theories and methods articulate a subsequent blurring of foreign policy's governance as a result of the state's pursuit. Of particular interest to this paper are social media actors such as *Facebook* and *Twitter* due to their intimate involvement with the sociopolitical turmoil erupting throughout the Arab world(s), of which will be anecdotally explored throughout the paper to demonstrate the state's compulsion to act through social media in order to monitor these sites of turmoil for perceived security threats.

The paper is divided into two sections. Generally speaking, the first section covers chapters one through four and traces the state's pursuit of social media actor. The second section encompasses chapters five through seven, and seeks to demonstrate how this pursuit can be read

as effectively 'blurring' the lines of foreign policy's governance. Chapter one, the "Foreign Policy Literature Review" explores the ways in which conventional foreign policy literatures are unequipped to account for the relationship between social media actors and the state within foreign policy. The paper examines two widely employed foreign policy texts used for educating both students of foreign policy and those seeking to enter the foreign policy service of the state: Rosati & Scott's The Politics of United States Foreign Policy as well as Cox and Stokes' U.S. Foreign Policy. The chapter will demonstrate that although these texts emphasize the ways in which private actors become involved within the foreign policy, especially due to the complexities of foreign policy's practices and processes, they give no attention to these actors within discussions of state security. Accordingly, the remaining chapters turn to various methods, theories, logics and understandings widely used within IPS to account for the limitations of conventional foreign policy literatures, beginning with chapter two on "Governmentality". Chapter two employs Foucault's concept of governmentality to demonstrate that conventional foreign policy literatures cannot comprehend the relationship between the state and social media within foreign policy because their understandings of what entails 'governance' is far too limited. The chapter subsequently expands understandings of 'governance' to demonstrate the ways in which the state comes to be involved in some of the smallest aspects of daily life, thus accounting for how the state is indeed capable of acting through private actors for purposes of state security. This discussion also demonstrates how the state is compelled to incorporate previously unrealized technologies, such as those controlled by social media actors, to advance its interests. Governmentality is also an important theoretical backbone behind chapter three's discussion of the "Foreign Policy Assemblage". Chapter three turns to the work of Haggerty and Ericson in "The Surveillant Assemblage" to render a theoretical framework

through which the state and social media actors can work together to achieve various ends of objectives. The concept of 'assemblage' is particularly important because it provides a way of articulating how the coalescing of interests between private and state actors facilitates the emergence of an entity which pursues objectives in the name of advancing governance, control, security, surveillance, profit and entertainment. The chapter is divided into three parts, the first introduces the concept itself, the second explores what these actors' interests are and how they coalesce, and the third employs Haggerty and Ericson's specific framing of "The Surveillant Assemblage" in order to establish what the main components of the foreign policy assemblage are. Chapter four discusses biopower, a particular form of political power employed by the state vis-à-vis social media technologies in order to manage populations. Biopower is particularly important for two reasons. First, it is a widespread method of control over subjects across western liberal democracies that ought to be discussed because it is not covered in conventional foreign policy literatures. Secondly, is through social media technologies that the state seeks to employ biopower upon foreign populations, as in doing so perceivably assists the state's security practitioners in identifying security threats.

The second section of this paper is explored across chapter five, "The Blurring of Who\What Governs Foreign Policy", chapter six on "Social Media's Political Space", and the conclusion in chapter seven. Chapter five demonstrates how the state's pursuit of social media actors abroad consequently contributes to an inability to determine who or what is actually governing foreign policy by virtue of these private actors' involvement. The chapter revisits the previous chapters' employment of the logics, understandings, methods and theories of IPS to demonstrate how pushing the extent of these concepts effectively problematizes the state's pursuit of social media actors and their technologies. Students of American Studies and political

science will find this section particularly useful because it demonstrates how the commitments of other disciplines can be used to explain various sociopolitical phenomena. The chapter unfolds by engaging this further exploration of the four previous chapters' concepts, with the inclusion of an additional chapter concerning 'social media's political space'. Beginning with chapter two's discussion on governmentality, the concept itself be demonstrated as being as much committed to problematizing state rule as much as it is committed to understanding it. Accordingly, Rose's work in Powers of Freedom explores how governance can occur between subjects, without the state, thus implicating the extent to which the state reigns supreme in the control of foreign policy. The next concept draws upon chapter three's focus on the foreign policy assemblage, and much like the previous discussion, concerns the extent to which the concept can be read as confounding attempts to delineate specifically who/what is governing foreign policy. While this discussion necessarily draws upon questions of governance, it also differs by virtue of its emphasis on the decentralizing nature and characteristics constituting the foreign policy assemblage itself. The third discussion revisits Foucault's exploration of political power, specifically to demonstrate how his commitment to understanding the free-flowing nature of political power tends to upset the state's manipulation thereof. In other words, the state's willingness to employ biopower vis-à-vis social media technologies is challenged by virtue of some theoretical considerations with regards to how political power flows between subjects. Building off this last discussion is the introduction of a previously unexplored concept throughout any of the chapters and specifically concerns Magnusson's 'political space' in The Search for Political Space.

A final discussion contributing to the blurring of foreign policy's lines of governance is discussed in chapter six, "Social Media's Political Space". Chapter six employs the logics of

'political spatiality', a highly influential contribution made to the field, especially with regards to understanding sociopolitical phenomena and without doing so through the state. As such, 'political space' is used to articulate an abstract domain of political power concentrated within the immediate purview of social media users for the specific purpose of resisting state control. The chapter unfolds by properly introducing the concept by virtue of its three components, and then proceeds to render an articulation of 'social media's political space'. The chapter then demonstrates the ways in which the third component of social media's political space, specifically concerning its juxtaposition to the state, becomes an important factor contributing to the blurring of foreign policy's lines of governance.

Preface

Prior to beginning the paper, two general discussions should be noted with regards to the purposes of this paper and what is meant by 'social media'. First and foremost, and as a Master's of Arts contribution to the field of American Studies, the paper seeks to demonstrate the efficacy of the field's interdisciplinary nature. Accordingly, the paper initially set out to engage a material issue that is current and relevant to contemporary discourses, ones which overlap various interests within American Studies and international politics, whilst simultaneously attempting to identify compelling methods and theories for doing so. The initial inspiration for the paper was through the observation of politics existing in and around social media actors and their respective technologies, especially as they have come to be pursued by the U.S. domestically and especially abroad. In essence, the paper looks for politics within the relationship between the state and social media actors and observes a puzzle, whereby the various theories and methods of IPS are employed to understand them accordingly. While this approach of 'finding politics' is very much in keeping with intellectual lineages within many IPS projects, another of which is an

acknowledgment of how some sociopolitical phenomena cannot be 'fully' understood.

Accordingly, this paper's specific division into two sections attempts to identify with these commitments: to first explain and attempt to understand, but then to problematize as a way of acknowledging the extent(s) to which the diversity of social processes at performance cannot be 'fully' comprehended and perfectly accounted for, as in doing so threatens foreclosing politics from existing as such. It is from these commitments that this paper cautions against a tendency within American Studies to turn to conventional foreign policy literatures in order to understand various aspects of the U.S.' role in international politics. Generally speaking, conventional foreign policy literatures tend to simplify the ways in which politics exist around the globe, such as, for example, surrounding the state's managing of 'national interest' and 'national security' abroad. The state also tends to be held as the sole actor responsible for providing security, where in many cases, this rationale runs the risk of preventing the possibility of accounting for the involvement of various non-state actors. As a consequence, the role of social media actors in questions of security, and the users who use these technologies to communicate their political experiences against states' security imperatives, become discounted. In other words, the magnitude of their impact on the daily unfoldings of political life is forgotten. Accordingly, the referencing of various IPS writers as well as those who have tremendously influenced the field such as Foucault, Haggerty, Ericson, Dillon, Reid, Magnusson and Muller, (to name a few) all assist in articulating both the relationship between social media actors and the state, and problematizing it for the ways in which it confounds who\what governs foreign policy. This paper identifies the latter of which as being tremendously important, and entertains this discussion in the name of creating room for politics and political life to exist without marginalizing it through the production of singular explanations and finite conclusions.

On a lighter note, and whilst (especially now) attempting not to fall prey to 'defining' it per se, the paper identifies 'social media' as web-based and mobile-based technologies used to transmit interaction, dialogue and written communication between those who use, and those who observe the transmissions of these technologies. Central to many social media technologies is the utilization of a service facilitating the transfer of user-generated content across cellular networks and the Internet for purposes of entertainment and profitability. Social media technologies are extremely diverse and relatively new products proliferating at an alarming rate, many of which incorporate some of the following platforms or specialize thereof: mobile device-specific 'apps'; Internet forums; web; social and micro 'blogs'; 'wikis'; podcasts; photographs; pictures; video; rating/polling devices; social bookmarking; electronic magazines. The most important aspect here is to understand social media by virtue of its facilitation of electronic interaction by its users and observers, via user-generated content. Two social media actors are of particular interest to this paper, of which are *Facebook* and *Twitter* specifically for the ways in which they have dominated with regards to population penetration around the globe:

- I. *Facebook* is a social networking service and website that was launched in February 2004.¹ As of May 2012, *Facebook* has over 900 million active users worldwide, with over fifty percent of them accessing *Facebook* via their mobile device.² Users are required to register prior to accessing and using *Facebook*, after which they create a 'personal profile' which can indicate their name, date of birth, address, telephone number, email address, workplace affiliation (including employer, employees and co-workers), educational affiliations, affiliated websites, who they associate with, photos, videos,

¹ Eric Eldon, 2008 Growth Puts Facebook In Better Position to Make Money. [Homepage of VentureBeat News][Online]. Available: <http://venturebeat.com/2008/12/18/2008-growth-puts-facebook-in-better-position-to-make-money>

² Ibid.

electronic common interest 'groups' or 'pages' they may register and belong to. *Facebook* requests that users be above the age of thirteen in order to access membership.³

Facebook's ownership, *Facebook, Inc.*, also stipulates that in order to become a *Facebook* user, one must accept the company's terms and conditions, of which indicates that *Facebook* owns all of the user-generated content uploaded, shared, sent or communicated on *Facebook* and that the company may use the information as it pleases.⁴

- II. *Twitter* is also a social networking service and micro-blogging service that provides its users the ability to send, receive and read text-based posts of up to 140 characters, known as 'tweets', may include hyperlinks to websites, primarily as a means to share information that cannot be directly viewed/observed via *Twitter's* platform, such as photos, pictures, videos, news links, as well.⁵ *Twitter* was founded in March 2006 by Jack Dorsey and launched in July of that year. The service has quickly gained popularity around the globe, with over 140 million active users as of January 2012, which generates approximately 340 million daily tweets and approximately 1.6 billion search queries per day.⁶ *Twitter* is owned by *Twitter, Inc.* and is based in San Francisco, with additional servers and offices located in New York City.⁷ Like *Facebook*, *Twitter* demands that its users agree to their

³ The New York Times, Facebook's Prospects May Rest on Trove of Data. [Homepage of The New York Times][Online]. Available: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/15/technology/facebook-needs-to-turn-data-trove-into-investor=gold.html?_r=1

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ MediaBistro, Twitter to Surpass 500 Million Registered Users on Wednesday. [Homepage of MediaBistro News][Online]. Available: http://mediabistro.com/alltwitter/500-million-registered-users_b18842

⁶ Alexa.com, Twitter.com Site Info. [Homepage of Alexa: The Web Information Company][Online]. Available: <http://www.alex.com/siteinfo/twitter.com>

⁷ Ibid.

terms and conditions, stipulating that *Twitter* owns the user-generated content uploaded, shared, sent or communicated across their platform.⁸

Social media actors and their respective technologies have immediate access to any and all user-generated content that is transmitted across their platforms, and it is precisely this information that the state is interested in accessing. Furthermore, the global penetration rate of these actors makes them compelling targets of the state's security interests, specifically surrounding surveillance (chapter three) and the advancement of biopolitically managing foreign populations (chapter four). As a final note on social media actors and their technologies, an important aspect of social media technologies is the way in which they become intimately and immediately involved in various locales of political life, both digitally and materially, as well as regionally and internationally. Accordingly, a subsequent phenomenon that this paper will explore is the way in which the state's pursuit of social media actors and their respective technologies effectively blurs the lines of who/what comes to govern U.S. foreign policy.

SECTION ONE

I: Foreign Policy Literature Review

Conventional understandings of United States foreign policy conceptualize it as a distinctively state-centric practice, characterized by attempts to geopolitically privilege U.S. political life from the 'anarchy' of govern-less international order. For example, consider Rosati and Scott's *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, wherein the preface for their arguments discusses the ways in which many readers of foreign policy tend to approach it with a rather simple and straightforward view of the foreign policy process: "that U.S. foreign policy is made

⁸ Ibid.

and defined basically at the top of the political hierarchy, especially by the President."⁹ The 'proper', 'official' and 'authorized' persons execute decisions with regards to foreign policy, with the biggest decisions being made in the White House. Nevertheless, the President and his advisers are crucial to the decision-making process, but they certainly are not alone in doing so.

The reality is that many other individuals and institutions are involved within the government and throughout society in the foreign policy process: presidential advisers, high-level officials within the executive branch, the foreign policy bureaucracies, Congress, the courts, state and local governments, the public, political parties, interest groups and social movements, the media, and international actors.¹⁰

From such an understanding, Rosati and Scott impress upon the reader a sense of complexity. Given the host of different institutions, groups and ideas involved within the foreign policy process, we can begin to appreciate the ways in which foreign policy is anything but a centralized process, exclusively belonging to the purview of the White House. As a widely used 'introduction' textbook for students of foreign policy and those seeking to enter the foreign service of the state, one of the first lessons ascertained from Rosati and Scott's work is precisely the idea that the conduct and practice of foreign policy is anything but something performed exclusively by the executive branch of government. Most importantly, they suggest that foreign policy often depends upon private, non-state actors. This attempt to debase assumptions of the foreign policy apparatus' centrality is not limited to Rosati and Scott's contributions. Cox and Stokes' U.S. Foreign Policy emphasizes the complexities behind the foreign policy process by suggesting from the book's onset that a diversity of factors are at play which invariably make the task of locating singular logics behind a particular policy outcome virtually impossible.¹¹ To

⁹ Jerel A. Rosati and James M. Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Fourth Edition. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth), 2004, 4-5.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 5.

¹¹ Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, *U.S Foreign Policy*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford), 2008, 8-9.

introduce students to foreign policy, Rosati and Scott, as well as Cox and Stokes, establish a conceptual foundation that compels the reader to visualize foreign policy as a complex web of interactions. As such, readers are discouraged from thinking of foreign policy as a singular/linear practice which can be traced definitively to one particular body or individual.

However, where these texts tend to stray from these logics are within their discussions of contemporary U.S. state security. Working in chronological order from which the texts were introduced, take for example Rosati and Scott's discussion of the U.S.' engagement with the 'war on terror'. Their discussion delineates the conduct of the 'war' as a practice and concern of the government, specifically listing 40 state departments, offices and administrations, categorized in accordance to responsibilities of National Policy, Intelligence, Preemption and Retaliation, Border Security, as well as Disaster Preparedness and Response.¹² What is of particular concern is the section's preface, where Rosati and Scott argue: "although the federal government appears monolithic to many, in the areas of terrorism prevention and response it has been anything but."¹³ In providing the reader a list of various governmental institutions involved in state security, and specifically the 'war on terror', they attempt to demonstrate a multiple and decentralized conceptualization of U.S. foreign policy, but herein lies a contradiction. While Rosati and Scott imply here that the state is *anything but* alone in the practice of state security, the state remains central. For example, their listing of predominantly globally-oriented agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency, the State Department, the Office of National Intelligence, Special Operations Command, and the National Security Agency, alongside largely domestically-oriented agencies, like the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Department of

¹² Jerel A. Rosati and James M. Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Fourth Edition. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth), 2004, 219.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Homeland Security, and the National Guard, all suggest a sense of decentralization characterized by the debasement of the White House and the Executive. However, this logic of decentralization is still limited to the immediate purview of the state itself. Of utmost concern, Rosati and Scott's initial recognition of the involvement of *private, non-state* actors disappears. Looking to Cox and Stokes' discussion of contemporary U.S. state security, similar discrepancies are apparent. The state appears once again as but a singular, large and characterless block of stone. After having introduced their readers to the 'war on terror' and its relationship with U.S. foreign policy, Cox and Stokes attempt to critically unpack the 'war on terror' for the ways in which it will commit the state to remaining in Iraq for reasons of geopolitical economics, specifically entailing the difficulties in ascertaining access to the world's oil reserves, as well as dealing with al-Qaeda for the foreseeable future given the strength of its anti-American commitments.¹⁴ The most concerning aspect of this discussion is the way in which Cox and Stokes have effectively (re)centered the state with regards to international anxieties underpinning U.S. state security. Conceptually speaking, the reader has been pulled away from the introductory logics of complexity and back towards the conventional rendering of foreign policy as a centralized practice of the state. Accordingly, one would not be remiss in conceptualizing the 'war on terror' as a billiard ball table wherein the U.S. is but a cue-ball smashing into al-Qaeda, Afghanistan and Iraq, driven by the cue that is U.S. foreign policy¹⁵. The implication of (re)centering the state here is that little room has been left for engaging discussions of foreign policy with regards to questions of private, non-state actors' involvement in the practices of state security. It would appear that Rosati and Scott offer a more nuanced appraisal by implying that the interactions between domestically-oriented and internationally-oriented state apparatuses signifies a multiple

¹⁴ Michael Cox and Doug Stokes, *U.S Foreign Policy*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford), 2008, 368-372.

¹⁵ Darel E. Paul, *Sovereignty, Survival and the Westphalian Blind Alley in International Relations*, in *Review of International Studies* (25)2, April 1999, 226.

and heterogeneous account of the conduct of foreign policy. However, their account still does not specifically locate private, non-state actors' utility. Where are media actors, and most importantly, social media actors?

To their defense, the emergence of 'social media' actors and their respective technologies is a relatively new phenomenon thus potentially explaining how they have remained 'under the radar' even within many academic circles. For example, and although the International Studies Association (ISA) does not represent the entirety of scholastic inquiry into social media and questions of state security, only recently have many ISA writers began exploring said questions.¹⁶ For example, at the ISA Annual Convention in San Diego 2012, 68 out of the total 2557 papers submitted¹⁷ were concerned with questions of social media and security.¹⁸ While these numbers indicate that interest is growing in social media actors' involvement with state security, the issue for this paper remains that conventional foreign policy literatures are not equipped for providing a conceptual framework through which social media actors can be understood as intimately involved in the various practices and processes of state security. In the third chapter, the paper looks to the logics and understandings offered by the field of International Political Sociology in order to produce a conceptual framework that is indeed equipped to account for social media actors' involvement with US foreign policy, specifically with regards to questions of state security. The third chapter turns to the work of Haggerty and Ericson in "The Surveillant Assemblage" and uses their conceptualization of assemblage to produce an alternate way of accounting for social media actors' and their respective technologies'

¹⁶ ISA Annual Convention San Diego 2012 Program, [Homepage of The International Studies Association][Online]. Available: http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/MyISA/Files/San%20Diego%202012_Program.pdf

¹⁷ ISA Annual Convention San Diego 2012 Conference Status, [Homepage of the International Studies Association][Online]. Available: http://www.isanet.org/annual_convention/2012/ISA2012ConferenceStats.pdf

¹⁸ ISA Annual Convention San Diego 2012 Program, [Homepage of The International Studies Association][Online]. Available: http://isanet.ccit.arizona.edu/MyISA/Files/San%20Diego%202012_Program.pdf

relationship with the State Department, and how this relationship plays a constitutive role in foreign policy. Prior to this third chapter, the paper engages a discussion of governmentality in chapter two. Governmentality is a particularly important concept to understand prior to making sense of an alternative conceptualization of foreign policy and this is primarily because the concept of assemblage depends upon the reader thinking about governance differently than foreign policy literatures tend to promote. Accordingly, the ways in which one thinks of 'governance' and of 'government' requires (re)establishing and this is achieved vis-à-vis Foucault's concept of governmentality.

II: Governmentality

Foucault's concept of governmentality is important for many reasons. First and foremost, it is a necessary theoretical backbone of many IPS logics and understandings, as well as of the concept of assemblage itself as the concept articulates how pervasive governance is (an observation absent from many conventional foreign policy literatures). Leading from point one is the second aspect of governmentality which demonstrates how a critical understanding of governance reveals the extent to which the state has come to be involved in some of the most seemingly mundane and miniscule aspects of daily life. Thirdly, it is the extent of the state's involvement that compels its pursuit for avenues of control that it has not previously enjoyed, such as the manipulation of social media for purposes of state security. Lastly, governmentality can also be read as an important theoretical account of how the state unsuccessfully realizes these new methods of control. This chapter will discuss the first three aspects in the order they were introduced. The fourth aspect will be explored in the paper's final chapter as an important factor contributing to the blurring of foreign policy's lines of governance.

As is the case with conventional readings of foreign policy, references to governance tend to privilege the state as the epicenter of authority, political power and decision-making. Whether this tendency to connect the 'state' to 'foreign policy' can be argued as a derivative of many logics of foreign policy studies, the ways in which governance tends to be conceptualized is as equally problematic. Imagining government in the mind's eye tends to 'see' it as a hierarchy of bureaucracies, departments, and legislatures operated by public officials who seek to exercise authority over the population in which they serve. The prevailing understanding of 'government' within foreign policy literatures is necessarily bound to top-down rationale, whereby political power is exercised within the state and only by the state, downwards upon its subjects. This top-down understanding of governance privileges the state as the *sole* governing body within foreign policy. This understanding does not provide a compelling account of governance, and for two reasons. First of all, this particular mode of rationale limits understandings of governance to specific mechanisms and techniques, such as police officers making arrests or the Internal Revenue Service demanding the payment of taxes. Accordingly, there is no space within this equation for the role of social media actors within the governance of, for example, foreign affairs. Through the methods and logics offered by governmentality, governance comes to be understood as far more implicating. To be precise, the state has far more capacity to govern its subjects than the conventional way of thinking tends to promote. Changing how to think about governance, vis-à-vis governmentality, is important for this paper than because it demonstrates that where locales exist for control to be realized, such as social media actors and their respective technologies, there also exists the state's willingness to utilize these locales in order to advance governance techniques. Secondly, the linear, top-down rationale of governance implies that somehow the state is always intimately involved in virtually all schemas of governance. As will

be discussed below in more detail, Foucault's conceptualization of governmentality was indeed intended precisely for the purposes of debasing conventional understandings of governance's linearity in an attempt to reveal the extents of the state's capacities to control its subjects.

Following his 1976 lectures at the College de France, Foucault developed the concept of 'governmentality' as an alternative theoretical account of governance. It was also intended as a methodological toolkit for tracing various modes and effects of governance. Governmentality was developed as a response to Foucault's observations regarding the tremendous enlargement of liberal democratic political power throughout the 20th century.¹⁹ It was apparent to Foucault that the various rationalities constituting sovereign and disciplinary practices were suddenly and unexpectedly (re)implanted within the territory of Western liberal governance. Largely inspired by the protests across the world throughout the 1970s, and especially so in France, Foucault sought to provide an account for the ways in which western liberal democratic governments came to dominate so many aspects of daily life, precisely what so many around the world were protesting at the time. A challenge facing Foucault was to develop a theoretical account of governance that provided a critical perspective, one that would problematize governance as an extremely complex network of power relations infiltrating virtually all practices and regimes of state government, and in a way that would permeate the thought processes of its subjects.²⁰ Accordingly, what governmentality provides is a way of seeing the state's governance everywhere, in the most miniscule facets of daily life. Well into the 21st century, governmentality is a widely prescribed 'way of thinking' about governance because it departs

¹⁹ Mitchell Dean. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* 2nd edition. (London: Sage Publications), 2009, 8.

²⁰ *Ibid*, 8-10.

from logics that tend to discuss governance as power relations in a linear and relatively unproblematized fashion.

Governmentality, whilst attempting not to strictly define it per se, can be understood as the 'conduct of conduct': to lead, direct, guide and perhaps imply how something might be done, is to conduct. As a verb, conduct reveals ethical and moral aspects, as in to 'conduct' one's self. As a noun, conduct also refers to the behaviors, actions and comportment of the subject, for example, the articulated set of an individual's behaviors. Discussions regarding the 'conduct of conduct' invariably locate evaluative and normative characteristics wherein it is presumed that groups and individuals ought to be guided by certain ideals, and that their behavior can be judged and manipulated. This logic of conducting conduct presumes that it is indeed possible to regulate and control behavior based upon the notion that state agents, such as police officers and public officials, exist with a purpose of regulating said behavior. From this perspective, we can understand governance, then, as entailing any attempt to shape, with some degree of deliberation, any or perhaps all aspects of behavior in accordance to particular sets of norms and for the purposes of a variety of ends or objectives.²¹ In other words, governance is not just about the state or public officials telling subjects what to do, but rather, that this 'telling' is backed by a variety of ideas and actors to alter how an individual thinks about how they behave. This is an important aspect of governance because it dramatically alters conventional top-down understandings to demonstrate how deeply implicating attempts to govern others can be. But of utmost importance here is the depth of these implications because they imply that a virtually endless array of techniques exist through which behavior modification can be take place.

²¹ Ibid, 18.

It is from this observation that the state comes to be understood as capable of a virtually endless array of techniques for control. For example, the Surgeon General's warning that 'smoking is bad' and may kill you, is not merely attempt to provide individuals a healthy lifestyle choice. Through the logics offered by governmentality, it is also read as an attempt to alter the way an individual thinks about her/his self, their health, their life's longevity, and their financial commitments, with particular emphasis upon the ways in which the *state* has effectively seduced and disciplined the individual into reconstituting her/his own thought processes and ultimately her/his behavior. The more and more individuals prescribe these logics, the more they partake in a process of reconstituting the state and its regimes of health. It is a circular process of mutual reconstitution, indeed. But the point here is that the attempt to control subjects with regards to smoking and their health becomes reinforced over time. It is from the nature of this observation that Foucault articulates the multiple ways in which the state has come to control the behavior of its subjects in the 20th century; state governance is no longer understood as simply the executing of a command upon subjects, but for the ways in which that command can fundamentally change the way people behave, all the while developing a dependency on the state for answers to many of life's challenging questions. The state has, in the 20th century, in a sense, become far more pervasive, intrusive, and diffuse than foreign policy literatures, for example, can account. This is an important aspect to understand prior to the next chapter on the foreign policy assemblage especially because it provides a perspective through which social media actors and their respective technologies become attractive locales for the state to continue realizing new techniques for control.

Most importantly, it is the realization that the state can manipulate subjects' thought processes and behavior that continues the state's pursuit of new techniques of control. For

example, the aforementioned example of the Surgeon General's warning is not limited to a quote in a government publication. It is found on cigarette packages, on billboard advertisements, in television commercials, and is becoming more and more apparent on social media sites such as *Facebook*.²² Furthermore, this message is reinforced by the state's regimes of health, found within hospitals, forwarded by nurses and doctors. A necessary and further implicating consequence is that this message is carried forth and communicated between individuals as they go about their daily lives. In a sense, the state has utilized a tremendous numbers of variables and locations to carry forth its willingness to control individuals' behavior. A healthy subject makes a productive subject, and so the case for why this happens is expected. Nevertheless, the point here is that where governance can exist, the state pursues those locales accordingly. It is from this third and final point that the paper can now to turn to a discussion of assemblage whereby the state's willingness to utilize social media technologies for purposes of state security can be understood.

III: The 'Foreign Policy Assemblage'

The paper set out by challenging conventional foreign policy literatures for the ways in which they privilege the state as the epicenter of command with regards to questions of state security, effectively leaving no room for the involvement of private, non-state actors. Governmentality assisted in demonstrating the short-sightedness of this account by highlighting the extent to which the state is indeed capable and willing to utilize some of the most mundane and seemingly infinitesimal locales to advance control, thus implying that private, non-state actors are very much targeted. It is here that this chapter takes cue. Turning to the work of

²² Twitter.com, Regina Benjamin MD 18th US Surgeon General, [Twitter Homepage of Regina Benjamin, 18th Surgeon][Online]. Available: <http://twitter.com/sgregina> (see '*tweets*' from 21 June 2012).

Haggerty and Ericson in "The Surveillant Assemblage", their particular discussion of the concept of 'assemblage' is used to provide a framework through which the relationship between the state and social media actors can be accounted for without necessarily privileging one over the other. Furthermore, it is the coalescing of interests between the state and social media actors for mutual benefit that facilitates the emergence of the foreign policy assemblage. In other words, and under the rubric of foreign policy, the concept of assemblage facilitates the ability to articulate how the state's various internationally oriented apparatuses, such as the White House, the State Department and various security regimes' interests in security, surveillance, governance and control necessarily reach out to social media actors, while these private actors' interests in profitability and entertainment are fulfilled by the state's usage of their technologies. The discussion of the foreign policy assemblage is divided into three parts. The first introduces the concept and explains how it is the coalescing of interests for mutual benefit that makes possible the relationship between state and private sector actors and subsequent emergence of the foreign policy assemblage. Part two explores what these specific interests of both the state and social media actors are, and part three establishes what specifically the foreign policy assemblage is, including its component parts: the state, social media actors, the body politic/national interest. These concepts will be introduced via a framework for conceptualizing the concept of assemblage, specifically inspired by their work in "The Surveillant Assemblage".

Part One: 'Assemblage' at a Glance

The concept of assemblage seeks to make sense of the ways in which the virtually endless interaction between a variety of individuals and the objects that constitute their surrounding, material environment work in concert to achieve various ends and objectives. Irrespective of who these individuals are and regardless of what these objects may happen to be,

the point here is to imagine a network of people, places, and things and the ways in which their direct and indirect, equal and unequal interactions formulate an entity, such as 'foreign policy'.

"Assemblages consist of a multiplicity of heterogeneous objects, whose unity comes solely from the fact that these items function together, that they 'work' together as a functional entity. They comprise discrete flows of an essentially limitless range of other phenomena such as people, signs, chemicals, knowledge and institutions. To dig beneath the surface stability of any entity is to encounter a host of different phenomena and processes working in concert."²³

When this passage is applied within the context of foreign policy, the mind tends to paint a relatively messy and rather unclear image of what foreign policy looks, as well as who and what is involved. For the purposes of this paper, this is indeed the point. By attempting to account for all of the aforementioned ideas, knowledges, locations, mechanisms and technologies that necessarily involved in the interactions that constitute 'assemblage', the state tends to receive far less attention. For example, by discussing the foreign policy *assemblage*, the reader begins thinking about *what else* constitutes foreign policy, and although the state will likely come to mind, the reader has done so without falling prey to privileging the state. Accordingly, space is made for the inclusion of other actors, most importantly being social media actors themselves. As stated in the aforementioned quote from Haggerty and Ericson is an important aspect concerning the ways in which an assemblage emerges by virtue of a number of objects working in concert together. This paper identifies the state and social media actors as very much working 'in concert together' and this is because of the way in which their interests coalesce for mutual benefit. Beginning with the state, take for example the way in which it tends to manage threats, and necessarily comes to involve social media actors and their respective technologies to quell threat anxieties accordingly.

²³ Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, in *British Journal of Sociology* 51(4), December 2000, 608.

Part Two: Emergence & Coalescing of Interests

The state's foreign policy bureaucracy is often articulated as in the service of 'national interest', its first and foremost concern is its 'security'. Accordingly, the terms are represented almost synonymously; national interest is first and foremost concerned with the nation's security. But a crucial aspect of national security is that it is perpetually caught-up in (re)interpreting 'risk' and 'danger' to the extent that 'threats' come to be constructed rather than somehow 'objectively' perceived.²⁴ Campbell argues, for example, that United States foreign policy is committed to constantly attempting to articulate senses of 'self' and 'other' in order to rationalize 'who is' and 'is not' existing with the U.S.' national interest in security at mind. This practice can be broken down and understood as attempts to interpret articulations of 'America' from within the United States and then cross-identifying them with articulations of what 'America' is from outside the United States. The logic at performance here is such that America derives its sense of self vis-à-vis articulations from within the territorial confines of the continental body politic itself. As discussed in the previous chapter, the head of the state and its body, which encompass the concept of body politic, is metaphorically speaking, a functioning entity. An implication of the ways in which this metaphor has been deposited within the logics underpinning the concept of body politic is that a functioning entity is presumed intact. In other words, the head and the body are not separated, but connected. America is thus understood and articulated regionally, not globally for that would signify disconnect and dismemberment thereof. When America is articulated outside of the continental U.S., they often become cross-identified by state officials and news media within security narratives which invariably juxtaposes them as alternate modes of being. What 'being' implies here is existence other than American existence. What the nature

²⁴ David Campbell. *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press), 1992, 5.

of rationalizing identity does is create a dichotomy between what is 'America' against what is not 'America. The latter tends to be constituted by 'unknowns', and what is unknown is primarily perceived within security narratives as 'danger'.²⁵

But dangers and threats cannot be resolved, for if they could, foreign policy would simply be useless and ineffective; as aforementioned, foreign policy is committed first and foremost to protecting national interest, and if there is nothing to be protected from, then the United States would be, as a matter of speaking, indefinitely safe or secure. It is the *inability* to achieve security that ironically guarantees foreign policy's existence: dangers and threats are written as conditions of possibility. Accordingly, observations of foreign policy officials *tweeting* over *Twitter* about violence in foreign regions, or posting photos of insurgent attacks on American military bases around the world, come to bear an important meaning, one much more important than the simple sharing of news. By allowing foreign policy's practitioners, such as United States' officials to communicate developments, or by even allowing these practitioners to *observe tweets* about foreign violence carried out against national interest/security, social media technologies become important technologies of national security, whereby threats and dangers are articulated and communicated almost instantaneously.

The most important occurrence of threat construction is the way in which the state tends to address them. Because they are a threat to national interest/security, the state invariably commits itself to managing threats as risks, and an important method for doing so is vis-à-vis surveillance. Haggerty and Ericson define surveillance as the "collection of information about populations for institutional and personal purposes."²⁶ While the definition appears simple, it is

²⁵ Ibid, 3.

²⁶ Kevin D. Haggerty and Amber Gazso, Seeing beyond the Ruins: Surveillance as a Response to Terrorist Threats, in the Canadian Journal of Sociology, 2005, 170.

broad enough to advance discussion about surveillance beyond the conventional emphases placed upon CCTV cameras and undercover law enforcement operations. Surveillance entails a broad network of activities that assumes an array of forms, including sensors, bureaucratic documentation, x-rays, satellites, and computerized databases. Accordingly, and especially so since 11 September 2001, Haggerty and Ericson observe that "we are only now beginning to appreciate that surveillance is driven by the desire to bring systems together, to combine practices and technologies and integrate them into a larger whole."²⁷ For example, law enforcement agencies continually look for ways to expand their surveillance techniques by integrating their different computer systems and databases: the FBI forensics section continuously attempts to link databases of fingerprints, ballistics and DNA.²⁸ What this willingness to enlarge implies is that the state's interests in governance and control, and especially of surveillance, seeks to employ new and previously unrealized technologies and techniques, of which this paper will later identify with social media.

Social media actors also have interests in a relationship with the state which effectively contributes to the emergence of the foreign policy assemblage. By virtue of how 'objects' within an 'assemblage' work 'together in concert', especially via due to the coalescing of interests for mutual benefit, consider that is simply advantageous for social media actors to assist the state in its pursuits of security. Each and every time foreign policy officials and practitioners, for example, *tweet* about the White House's position on foreign developments²⁹, or post text, photo

²⁷ Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, The Surveillant Assemblage, in *British Journal of Sociology* 51(4), December 2000, 610.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Twitter.com, Twitter homepage of the U.S. Department of State [Homepage of Twitter.com and the U.S. Department of State's Twitter profile][Online]. Available: <http://www.twitter.com/StateDept>

or video updates on *Facebook* about upcoming events with foreign policy officials³⁰, there is both simultaneous exposure of social media products to new, potential users, as well as the legitimization of the technologies' existence as a tool of 'official' government communication. With regards to state interests in the relationship, and as discussed earlier, national security and national interest are of utmost importance, and social media makes aspects of correlating national security and national interest possible. The state has committed many resources to acting through social media actors in order to ascertain information about Americans: 25,000 requests by the state towards *Google* (11,000 of which concerned Americans) and 25,000 requests by the state towards *Verizon*. In early 2010, the DOJ argued that the Stored Communications Act permits it to ascertain users' search query data (on *Google*, for example) without a warrant.³¹ Furthermore, *Facebook* has also been deeply involved in assisting law enforcement agencies in investigating crimes and finding evidence by providing location information, potential motives and alibis, as well as inter-user communications.³² To say that social media actors are not benefitting from their involvement with the state is but a cheap observation.

Part Three: Component Parts

Haggerty and Ericson's discussion of the surveillant assemblage is particularly useful because it provides a methodological framework for establishing what the foreign policy assemblage is and what it entails. Specifically speaking, the surveillant assemblage was explained in three primary component parts, and it is from this method of characterization that

³⁰ Facebook.com, Facebook homepage of the U.S. Department of State [Homepage of Facebook.com and the U.S. Department of State's Facebook profile][Online]. Available: <http://www.facebook.com/usdos>

³¹ MediaPostNews, Vanity Searcher Can Proceed With Lawsuit Against Google. [Homepage of MediaPostNews][Online]. Available: <http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/171458/vanity-searcher-can-proceed-with-lawsuit-against-g.html>

³² U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division, CRM-200900732F - Letter to Mr. James Tucker and Mr. Shane Witnov, from Chief of the Office of Enforcement Operations, Rena Y. Kim. [Homepage of the Electronic Frontier Foundation][Online]. Available: https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetworking.pdf

the foreign policy assemblage will be articulated. Accordingly, the first component part of the foreign policy assemblage is the state and its various apparatuses. While the concept of assemblage tends to emphasize the involvement of non-state actors, the state remains an important actor within the concept of assemblage. It is not to be removed, the point rather is that it is a major component, just not the central component.³³ Between the U.S. bureaucracy's internationally oriented agencies and domestically oriented agencies, dozens constantly compete and cooperate for representation within the creation of domestic and foreign policy: "There are over 5 million personnel located in fifteen major departments and hundreds of other organizations and agencies, who spend nearly \$2 trillion a year on thousands of programs and policies directed towards the United States and the world."³⁴ With regards to the foreign policy bureaucracy itself, the Department of Defense, being the largest of all executive branch organizations, employs over three million civilian and military personnel, and spent over \$680 billion of the national budget in 2009 alone.³⁵ Along with the Department of Defense, are the Department of State, including its diplomatic corps and the Central Intelligence Agency, which play dominant foreign policy roles as well, not to mention the involvement of the Department of the Treasury, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of Homeland Security. Beyond the aforementioned agencies, "it would not be an exaggeration to say that virtually every department and agency in the executive branch contains an international component."³⁶ Irrespective of staff size, operating budget or mandate, each organization has its own subcultures, many of which have their own specific missions and goals which, more than

³³ Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, *The Surveillant Assemblage*, in *British Journal of Sociology* 51(4), December 2000, 608-10.

³⁴ Jerel A. Rosati and James M. Scott, *The Politics of United States Foreign Policy*, Fourth Edition. (Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth), 2004, 104.

³⁵ *The Hill News*, Senate OKs defense bill, 68-29. [Homepage of The Hill News][Online]. Available: <http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/64377-senate-to-vote-on-defense-bill#>

³⁶ *Ibid.*

often, overlap and have differing levels of autonomy from Presidential authority. To further complicate things, since 11 September 2001, the national security bureaucracy has expanded in ways that have effectively blurred the lines between foreign policy and domestic policy bureaucracies.

The second major component part of the foreign policy assemblage are the non-state, private sector social media actors themselves. By looking at the nature of the interactions between the state and social media actors between 2000 and 2012, for example, it would be hard *not* to see how social media actors have developed a close relationship with the state for purposes of security. For example, *Google's 2011 Transparency Report* provides a compelling snapshot of the state's interest and involvement with social media actors: 11,000 of 25,500 requests by the U.S. government for information on individuals directly pertained to American citizens.³⁷ A closer look at developments over the past year reveals that there is a marked inclusion of social media actors within the state's willingness to monitor its own population. Take, for example, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) recent application, with accompanying affidavit, for a search warrant ordering *Google* to unlock a screen-locked Android phone.³⁸ Specifically speaking, the application requests *Google* to provide any and all means necessary for gaining access, including login and password information, password reset, and/or manufacturer default code in order to obtain the complete contents of the memory of the seized phone. The phone was seized from Dante Dears, founding member of the *Pimpin' Hoes Daily* street gang. On 17 January 2012, the FBI agent who obtained the cell phone used the aforementioned search warrant to look through the memory of the seized cell phone. According to the affidavit, FBI

³⁷ Google, Transparency Report 2011. [Homepage of Google][Online]. Available: <http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/>

³⁸ U.S. District Court of Southern California, Application and Affidavit for Search Warrant Case No. 12MJ0882. [Homepage of the United States Internet Archive][Online]. Available: <http://ia700805.us.archive.org/15/items/gov.uscourts.casd.378626/gov.uscourts.casd.378626.1.0.pdf>

technicians at the FBI *Regional Computer Forensics Lab* (RCFL) were unable to get past the cellphone's "pattern lock" access controls, of which protect the cell phone by temporarily freezing access to its memory in the event that too many incorrect unlock sequences are entered. Interestingly enough, the memory of the phone can only be un-frozen by entering the user's *Gmail* username and password. So what makes this case important? It suggests that a mere warrant might be enough to get *Google* to unlock cell phones. Although this does not indicate that the state is capable of remotely accessing a cell phone's information via the Internet, it does clearly delineate the state's willingness to employ the data collected and compiled by a social media actor in pursuit of desire's to monitor the actions of the U.S. population.

Then again, the state often does *not* require a warrant in order to do so. According to an official *Department of Justice* (DOJ) report, the use of 'emergency', warrantless requests to *Internet Service Providers* (ISPs) for customer communications has increased over 400% in 2009 alone. What makes this proliferation of warrantless requests a concern with regards to social media actors are the ways in which their 'applications' generate most of their user activity via mobile, cell phone technologies. What the following reports do not disclose is how many of them were cell phone requests. Irrespective of whether or not they were indeed cell phone account requests, the state's interest in internet-related technologies, for the ways in which they carry user information, makes the case for the state's interest in using *any* means necessary for the monitoring of its population quite compelling. A 2009 DOJ report reveals that law enforcement agencies under its purview sought and obtained communications content for 91 internet accounts.³⁹ This number indicates a significant increase from previous years, wherein 17

³⁹ U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ 2702 Report 2010 - Letter to The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., from Assistant Attorney General, Ronald Weich. [Homepage of Spying Stats][Online]. Available: <http://files.spyingstats.com/exigent-requests/doj-2702-report-2010.pdf>

accounts were accessed in 2008,⁴⁰ 9 accounts in 2007,⁴¹ and 17 accounts in 2006.⁴² When Congress passed the Electronic Communications Privacy Act in 1986, it allowed law enforcement agencies the ability to obtain stored communications and customer records in emergencies without the need for a court order. In such scenarios, a carrier can disclose the information requested within it. Interestingly yet unfortunately enough, these requests only scratch the surface. A letter submitted by *Verizon* to Congressional committees in 2007 revealed that the company had received 25,000 emergency requests during the previous year.⁴³ Of these 25,000 requests, only 300 were from federal law enforcement agencies. In contrast, the reports submitted by Congress to the Attorney General reveal less than 20 disclosures for that same year. Having said this, it is quite clear that the DOJ's statistics are not accurately reporting the scale of this form of surveillance. The current USA PATRIOT "Improvement and Reauthorization Act 2005" reveals tremendous inconsistencies with regards to how federal law enforcements agencies are to report their information requests to Congress.⁴⁴ This act can also be read as a 'backdoor' or 'work-around' for the reporting of information requests, as local and state law enforcement agencies are not required to submit anything whatsoever, and it does not apply to agencies outside of the DOJ, like the Secret Service. Finally, and most importantly, these reporting laws

⁴⁰ U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ 2702 Report 2009 - Letter to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, from Assistant Attorney General, Ronald Weich. [Homepage of Spying Stats][Online]. Available: <http://files.spyingstats.com/exigent-requests/doj-2702-report-2009.pdf>

⁴¹ U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ 2702 Report 2008 - Letter to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, from Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Brian A. Benzckowski. [Homepage of Spying Stats][Online]. Available: <http://files.spyingstats.com/exigent-requests/doj-2702-report-2008.pdf>

⁴² U.S. Department of Justice Office of Legislative Affairs, DOJ 2702 Report 2007 - Letter to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy, from Acting Assistant Attorney General, Richard A. Hertling. [Homepage of Spying Stats][Online]. Available: <http://files.spyingstats.com/exigent-requests/doj-2702-report-2007.pdf>

⁴³ TechDirt.com, DOJ Had 400% More Emergencies That Required Immediate Warrantless Info From ISPs? [Homepage of TechDirt.com][Online]. Available: <http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110805/03270515402/doj-had-400-more-emergencies-that-required-immediate-warrantless-info-isps.shtml>

⁴⁴ CRS Report for Congress, USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005: A Legal Analysis. [Homepage of The Federation of American Scientists][Online]. Available: <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33332.pdf>

do not apply to emergency disclosures of non-content information, such as a user's geo-location data (their geographical, physical whereabouts), as well as subscriber information (name and address), and IP addresses used. What this all means is that Congress really has no idea how many warrantless requests are made to ISPs each year, and so nor does the public. What the two stories paint here however is a clear picture of the state's interest in social media actors, whose applications and technologies 'piggy-back' the services provided by ISPs like *Verizon*. These examples specifically refer to domestically-situated experiences and as such only paint part of the picture. The aforementioned discussion was important to demonstrate the ways in which social media is indeed pursued by the state, specifically for security purposes. But of utmost importance to this paper is social media's involvement with the U.S. internationally. One of the challenges of the paper was unearthing the state's involvement with social media actors for security purposes abroad, specifically because international experiences are not as 'hot' issues for both news media and the academy. As discussed in chapter one, one way to account for this lack of inquiry into social media actors and the state abroad is simply because social media and security issues, as a theme for inquiry, is currently burgeoning and almost exclusively so within domestic discourses. The previously discussed legal issues surrounding the Department of Justice and its interactions with *Twitter* and *Facebook*, for example, could not indicate this more clearly. Baring in mind the state's willingness to pursue domestically-situated actors and their respective technologies, a strong case can be made for the state's interest in continuing to pursue technologies abroad. Nevertheless, a few internationally situated experiences exist and will be explored to demonstrate the state's willingness to act through and utilize them accordingly.

The Department of Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) department produced a report in 2008 entitled "Social Networking Sites and Their

Importance to the Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS)." The report was designed as an instructional for FDNS agents on how to use social media technologies for the purposes of monitoring individuals, especially by joining 'friend' networks, in order to collect information on specific individuals applying for citizenship within the U.S.⁴⁵ Throughout the report are references to 'surveillance', a practice through which FDNS agents are instructed to employ in order to adjudicate foreigners' candidacy by virtue of the agents' judgment as to whether or not foreigners applying for citizenship are 'honest' or 'deceitful' in character. While the USCIS' tendency to treat its agents as perfectly neutral and objective surveillance mechanisms raises a number of ethical concerns, of primary concern here is not only how this example clearly signifies the state's interest in monitoring foreigners, but how the state has created an avenue through which it can effectively monitor individuals who are *not* applying for citizenship: "Narcissistic tendencies in many people fuels a need to have a large group of 'friends' link to their pages and many of these people accept 'cyber-friends' that they don't even know. This provides an excellent vantage point for FDNS."⁴⁶ Again, the extent to which an FDNS agent is qualified to psychoanalytically evaluate individuals based upon digital representations is curious, but the point here is that the agents are now actively involved in basing their judgments upon an individual of interest against interactions with others. The FDNS' logic suggests that agents are equipped to pass judgment based upon qualities of trustworthiness (or lack thereof), which are invariably dependent upon other individuals' reactions/comments. Thus, the FDNS agents are also committed to evaluating behavioral qualities of applicants' social networking friends. The primary concern here is that the FDNS agents are, if even indirectly,

⁴⁵ HuffingtonPost.com, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services: Social Networking Sites and Their Importance to FDNS. [Homepage of the Huffington Post][Online]. Available: http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/DHS_CustomsImmigration_SocialNetworking.pdf

⁴⁶ Ibid.

monitoring, evaluating and categorizing non-applicants in the process as well. Simply speaking, the state is monitoring the activities of non-American foreigners vis-à-vis social media technologies, irrespective of their desire to become U.S. citizens or remain abroad otherwise.

What makes the previous example particularly salient is how social media technologies facilitate the capacity to observe the interactions of non-American foreigners around the globe by virtue of their interaction with individuals of interest. When this observation is expanded to include non-American foreigners' interactions with regards to events of concern, the potentiality for surveillance dramatically increases. The Department of State has been intimately involved with grass-roots movements around the globe to encourage foreign populations to overthrow regimes viewed rather unfavorably by the White House.⁴⁷ For example, the Iranian national elections of 12 June 2009 witnessed the Department of State asking *Twitter* to refrain from performing server maintenance tasks, of which would effectively prevented Iranians from communicating to the world the election's progress and outcome.⁴⁸ What makes this transaction particularly interesting is that it signifies the U.S.' attempt to shrink the gap that is her lack of on-the-ground influence in Iran as the U.S. has no Embassy there. On the one hand, *Twitter* provided the U.S. critical information amidst a prolonged crackdown on journalists by Iranian authorities. The most important aspect of this pursuit is that it creates tremendous avenues for the realization of surveillance capacities *internationally*. Ultimately, the aforementioned discussions demonstrate how the relationship between the U.S. and social media actors evolved and came to be an important aspect of foreign policy and consequently two component parts within the foreign policy assemblage.

⁴⁷ Clay Shirkey, *The Political Power of Social Media: Technology, the Public Sphere, and Political Change*, in *Foreign Affairs*, (90)1, 2011, 47-8.

⁴⁸ CNN Anderson Cooper 360, *State Department to Twitter: Keep Iranian tweets coming*. [Homepage of CNN][Online]. Available: <http://ac360.blogs.cnn.com/2009/06/16/state-department-to-twitter-keep-iranian-tweets-coming/>

While Haggerty and Ericson identify 'the body' as another major component part of the surveillant assemblage, the third and final component of the foreign policy assemblage focuses upon the 'body politic' or more simply, the U.S. population itself. This component is important because it is the American population that the state seeks to protect, thus necessitating its pursuit of social media actors in the first place. Accordingly, the *body politic* is a particularly important component of the foreign policy assemblage because as a concept it refers to the American population as a single group through which the state seeks to secure and protect. The body politic is understood as a metaphor, likened to the human body, whereby the population represents the 'body' itself, and the government serves as the body's apex or 'head'.⁴⁹ If the population can be understood as a *body, headed* by the state, then the point here is to recognize that the body's protection is the sole responsibility of the body's head. This has been a recurring logic throughout the formation of the U.S. as a state. The body politic's first employment can be found in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 which declared that "the body politic is formed by a voluntary association of individuals; it is a social compact by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and each citizen with the whole people."⁵⁰ The body politic is also summarized within the Declaration of Independence, which posits that the securing of Americans' rights begins with the notion that "Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their powers from the consent of the governed."⁵¹ The longstanding reference to the perceived that the role of the U.S. state is to represent the body of Americans as a whole also exists within the state's foreign policy bureaucracy itself. The U.S. Department of State is the federal executive department responsible for the international relations of the U.S. and is mandated to "create a more secure,

⁴⁹ A. D. Harvey, *Body politic: political metaphor and political violence*, (Cambridge Scholars Publishing), 2007, 4-6.

⁵⁰ Supreme Judicial Court, *John Adams and the Massachusetts Constitution*. [Homepage of the Massachusetts Judicial Branch][Online]. Available: <http://www.mass.gov/courts/sjc/john-adams-b.html>

⁵¹ Kenneth Olwig, *Landscape, nature, and the body politic*, (University of Wisconsin Press), 2002, 87.

democratic, and prosperous world for the benefit of the *American people* and the international community."⁵² If only by virtue of a sociolinguistic transformation, the notion of body politic is important here because it establishes the role of the Department of State as primarily concerned with representing Americans as a collective body of citizens. But the concept of a 'body' of people, whether referred to as a body of political subjects, or simply as the American population itself, begs questions as to *how* the state represents the population.

'National interest' thus becomes an important mechanism through which the foreign policy assemblage seeks to represent the body politic. While the U.S. Department of State is tasked to create a 'secure, democratic and prosperous world', it is also officially mandated to do so in the name of American national interest.⁵³ The concept is often referred to by the French expression *raison d'État*, or 'reason of state' which is understood by the U.S. government as the nation state's goals and ambitions, whether they are economic, militaristic, cultural or sociopolitical. It should be noted that term national interest is one of much debate and deliberation throughout the academy. For example, many scholars have taken *national interest* to task for the ways in which it has been employed almost *ad nauseum* by state officials and international relations writers alike, without ever actually being able to define it. The degrees to which these arguments have been formulated differ tremendously. For example, Clinton argues that the term national interest has been frequently criticized in international relations for its ambiguity as it often leads to unethical state practices led by the single-minded selfishness of a

⁵² U.S. Department of State, The United States of America Foreign Policy Agenda, [Homepage of the United States Department of State][Online]. Available: <http://usinfo.state.gov/pub/ejournalusa/foreignpolagenda.html>

⁵³ Constitutional Rights Foundation, War and International Law, America's Foreign Policy: A Brief History. [Homepage of the Constitutional Rights Foundation][Online]. Available: <http://www.crf-usa.org/war-in-iraq/foreign-policy.html>

small group of people.⁵⁴ Furthermore, he suggests that writers who attempt to indict national interest do so on largely normative grounds, thus rendering alternative understandings of the term as but destined to the same arguments of 'good' versus 'bad' that they sought to avoid in the first place. Unfortunately, Clinton's conclusion falls prey to the same normative rationale, wherein he argues that national interest can be achieved through an amalgamation of six differing views, which are believed to be capable of settling the linkages between the population's desires and some universalized framework of ethicality.⁵⁵ Others, such as Nincic, fall prey to similar interpretations wherein the normative justifications used for deriving national interest are found within the state's interpretation of Americans' desires.⁵⁶ The issue at hand is with regards to these differing interpretations of 'national desire' because they simply believe that it exists. How could we argue that the 'interests' of 313 million can be summarized into one, or even a few, foreign policy objectives? It may be more appropriate to understand national interest as a rhetorical device, one that is intimately bound to interpretations of 'danger' and 'security' and employed by those who have a stake in foreign policy outcomes.⁵⁷ National interest thus becomes a crucial mechanism within the foreign policy assemblage because it facilitates the ability to chalk-up the body politic/American population's 'interests' to be first and foremost concerned with security. Accordingly, the foreign policy assemblage comes together by virtue of the ways in which these component parts work together in concert: the body politic represented by the state, specifically through the evocation of national interest which is allegedly concerned

⁵⁴ W. David Clinton, *The National Interest: Normative Foundations*, in *The Review of Politics* (48)4, (Cambridge University Press), 1986, 495.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*

⁵⁶ Miroslav Nincic, *The National Interest and Its Interpretation*, in *The Review of Politics* (61)1, (Cambridge University Press), 1999, 29.

⁵⁷ David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press), 1998, 12-13.

with the population's security, all of which depends upon social media actors and their respective technologies abroad.

The next chapter considers the state's interest in advancing a particular power that allows it to control foreign populations. In a sense, social media technologies are useful for the state in quelling internationally-oriented national security anxieties, but also because they allow the state to employ a particular political power through which the state can actively manage foreign populations. Biopower becomes a crucial identification because it is, as a matter of speaking, is a technique of control that the state seeks to implement in order to manage foreign populations and threats believed to exist in and amongst them.

IV: (Bio)Political Power

Biopower is an especially important identification for this paper and for two reasons. First, it is not a mechanism of the state's political control articulated by conventional foreign policy literatures. By virtue of Foucault's popularity within IPS, specifically for the ways in which his analyses of political power highlight the extent of the state's involvement in daily life, biopower is employed to provide a more nuanced account of what the state seeks to achieve by acting through social media actors abroad. Secondly, it is a compelling account of a state mechanism of governance as it assists the state in monitoring the various activities taking place amongst populations occupying regions where security threats are perceived to exist. These anxieties are constructed and exacerbated by the state's lack of on-the-ground resources around the globe, and so biopower becomes a particularly sought after form of political power to make what is 'unknown' known but in a very specific manner. Social media actors and their respective technologies become particularly important here because they facilitate the state's capacity to

employ biopower, of which is achieved through the monitoring of activities on social networking sites. In other words, social media technologies are a vehicle through which biopower is employed. Biopower was realized as a form of Western liberal democratic control in the late 1970s by Foucault, and the concept is anything but simple to understand. What makes it particularly challenging to grasp is that biopower concerns some of the mundane and unsuspecting daily activities of political life. The chapter will begin by reviewing Foucault's analysis of the three major forms of political power exercised by the state. Following these precursory discussions, an examination of what biopower entails and how it interacts with social media technologies will ensue.

Biopower is not the 'first' form of political power that Foucault traced throughout his career. By virtue of its rather recent discovery in the late 20th century, it is important to understand how biopower came to be recognized as an extension of the sovereign and disciplinary forms of political power exercised by the state prior to the discovery of biopower.⁵⁸ Sovereign power, the first of three political powers, stems from royalty in the Middle Ages and traditionally concerned ruling exercised by the king who inherited or violently won his legitimacy to rule.⁵⁹ Within a contemporary context, and specifically with regards to Western liberal democracies, sovereign power is typically associated as a power of rulers, such as Presidents and Prime Ministers and concerns the state's administration of rule vis-à-vis specific mechanisms such as those of the legal/judicial branches of government. Sovereign power controls subjects specifically through, for example, the assessment of taxes and the enforcement of the law by penalizing subjects for violations thereof. These punishments are delivered through visible state agents such as Law Enforcement officers thus making sovereign power the most

⁵⁸ Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended*. (New York: Picador), 1997, 239-45.

⁵⁹ *Ibid*, 26-9.

apparent and obviously visible of the three political powers. Accordingly, shortcomings of sovereign power are its extremely visible representation of state governance and that it specifically operates through punishment. As such, it is a rather limited form of control over subjects.

The second form of political power was observed by Foucault through his studies of the practices of the Bourgeoisie in the 17th and 18th centuries: disciplinary power. Throughout this time period, the human body became identified by the state as a productive force, and as such, an important focus of political life both for the livelihoods of subjects, and their further subjugation and control. During this time period, those who were not capable of working and proved to be unproductive (criminals, misfits, the 'mad') were banished in many Western societies.⁶⁰ Although there is no real value in according that the banishment of unproductive members of society was desirable to anyone in a position to govern workers (notably upper class individuals with intimate ties to government), the point here is that through the realization that these unproductive individuals could be isolated, the workforce could stay productive and the isolated would learn to be productive vis-à-vis *discipline*⁶¹. On the one hand, by removing unproductive members from the workforce, workers were pressured to work diligently or face the consequences thereof. As a matter of speaking, time and labor was extracted from these workers by constant surveillance, which gave tremendous form to *disciplinary* power. On the other hand, those removed from workforces were *disciplined* much like the way a prisoner is subject to psychologists, programme facilitators and parole officers, all of which play an instrumental role in determining the length of time a prisoner would remain as such. The former example articulates the earliest forms of disciplinary power and tends to be less of a method of disciplinary deliverance within

⁶⁰ Ibid, 185.

⁶¹ Ibid, 185-7.

contemporary Western liberal democratic rationalities of governance. This is especially because the isolating of individuals with physical abnormalities, as well as their subsequent receiving of direct, physical correction, was a focus during 19th century liberal democratic rule. The latter example articulates a more contemporary example of disciplinary power because it focuses on behavioral and cognitive (ab)normalities such as consumptive habits, daily routines, appearance, demeanor, etc. Nevertheless, both cases demonstrate the ways in which the state has attempted to become intimately involved in encouraging subjects' self-governance. Through the disciplining of their own behavior in an attempt to become and remain 'normal' citizens, subjects avoid perhaps the more direct interventions of sovereign punishment. However, where disciplinary power falls short with regards to this paper's puzzle, is that it is a rather challenging method of governance to employ for the purposes of 'knowing' a collectivity of individuals, especially when they are not within the immediate geophysical purview of the state.

Enter biopower, of which specifically concerns the management of populations and the governing over life itself.⁶² Generally speaking, there are two forms of biopower that are important to note. One centers upon the body as a machine whereby its biological and mechanical functions can be employed in order to optimize, employ, extort and even discipline individuals for particular ends and objectives. The other focuses upon the collective of human bodies as a *species*, as in doing so facilitates the ability to categorize subjects in terms of their propagation, birth/death rates, life expectancy, and the various conditions that effect these criteria. The most important part of this second understanding of biopower is that categorizing human beings as a *species* facilitates their study and subsequent management as a form of biological creature, thus giving rise to the term 'population'. The term emerged via the amalgam

⁶² Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality*, (New York: Random House Inc.), 1990, 139.

of statistics about human beings by virtue of the scientific study of humans as a biological species. Accordingly, knowledge produced concerning human being's physical properties greatly assisted states in the determining how they should be governed. As statistics were compiled concerning, for example, birth rate, death rate, and propagation, the collection and employment of these numbers facilitated the realization that the collective of human beings could be managed. Biopower is an essential form of political power to recognize because it is also largely responsible for the emergence of contemporary Western liberal democratic governance. Accordingly, biopower has come to envelope the rule of contemporary Western liberal democratic governance so much so that the collective body of political subjects, the population has come to:

manage[s] itself through a series of disciplinary regimes, learned and reinforced by state institutions such as the asylum, prison, school and so on, develops and deepens into the species body of biopolitics, where behavior and disciplinary regimes focus on biological process.⁶³

In other words, biopower facilitates a degree of self-governance by populations, wherein the 'health' of a population becomes a central concern of the contemporary consciousness of liberal governance, expressed and experienced by governors and the governed alike. It is not merely a mentality of liberal governance by the state, but a pervasive belief throughout modern Western society that one's health is of utmost concern against those of daily life. An important aspect concerning the health of the population that should be noted is the slipperiness of the term itself. While many agree that smoking is not healthy and is consequently promoted by the state as a life-threatening practice, rationales suggesting that one's health benefits from exposure to a proper education or exercising tends to be less transparent. Nevertheless, the point here is to

⁶³ Benjamin J. Muller, *Security, Risk and the Biometric State: Governing Borders and Bodies*, (Milton Park, Abingdon: Routledge), 2010, 11.

recognize the ways in which biopower has come to facilitate the state's involvement in the daily affairs of its subjects throughout the late 20th century and well into the 21st century.

Where biopower becomes particularly important to this paper is that the emergence of the term population facilitates the state's ability to 'know' what is happening to/within a population. By keeping tabs on mortality rates and birth rates, for example, the state realizes the ability to create a condition of 'knowing' a population and thus facilitates political action accordingly. Unlike sovereign power, which invariably concerns the state's power over subjects' death, and unlike disciplinary power, which can only be applied to aggregates of individuals at a time, biopower facilitates a preoccupation over life itself. As a matter of speaking, biopower is the most invasive of the three political powers because it actively involves the promotion of life itself; biopower *makes* life live and does so through 'knowing' populations.

It is through the combination of social media being utilized as a surveillance technique, as well as the state's recognition that social media technologies are being used and consequently exist in regions where the U.S. 'is not', that social media technologies become important *biopolitical* technologies as well. As Campbell discussed, what is unknown is a danger, of which must be made known if the U.S. is to be secure. According to the Department of State's mandate, security is the primary objective of foreign policy and, as such, is the focal concern of the national interest. Names, ages, dates of birth, locations, photographs, videos, political views, career and social affiliations, shopping preferences, favorite television shows, and educational backgrounds are but some of the pieces of data regularly collected by social media entities abroad. When considering the rates at which social media actors penetrate subscribers worldwide, the case of the United States' interest in social media actors abroad dramatically increases. In Bahrain, there are 346, 500 *Facebook* accounts, which increased by 101, 320

between January 2012 and April 2012.⁶⁴ In Libya, there are 473, 900 accounts, up 82, 480 between January 2012 and April 2012.⁶⁵ In Tunisia, 2, 958, 200 accounts, up 158, 940 between the same months, and in Egypt, there are 10, 588, 800 accounts, up 1, 195, 100 in the same months.⁶⁶ As of 2012, there are 800 million total *Facebook* accounts worldwide, and the population penetration of social media technologies overall is increasing at unprecedented rates.⁶⁷ Most importantly, what all of this information facilitates is the realization and further extension of the biopolitical powers that the state has come to predominantly govern through in the 21st century.

As discussed in the previous chapter, and unlike disciplinary and sovereign power, biopower grants the state the ability to govern or 'manage' populations. Through the information that social media actors compile, and the ways in which users' interactions via social media technologies virtually narrate what these users are doing, the capacities for 'population management' reaches previously unrealized levels. It is important to keep in mind that 'managing' a population does not imply managing in the sense of 'hands-on' directing; the state is not 'telling' people what to do, per se. Rather, biopower facilitates a form of management that refers to keeping tabs on a foreign population's status, such as its perceived health and wellbeing. Irrespective of what constitutes these qualities, the point here is that social media technologies have facilitated the state's capacity to compile this information. What makes this process particularly compelling, is that the state's foreign policy bureaucracies, notably those concerned with threat (de)construction and national interest/security, are capable of isolating and

⁶⁴ SocialBakers.com, Facebook Statistics by country. [Homepage of SocialBakers.com][Online]. Available: <http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/>

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Kompas.com, 43.1 Million Members of Facebook in Indonesia. [Homepage of Kompas News][Online]. Available: <http://english.kompas.com/read/2012/02/02/08412923/43.1.Million.Members.of.Facebook.in.Indonesia>

identifying rifts and interruptions to the wellbeing of foreign populations. This is not to say, however, that biopower only concerns an entire population. Population, as a term, was realized via Foucault's conceptualization of biopolitics, and as such, becomes an important feature of biopolitical analyses. Another important aspect of biopolitics is the way in which it also provides the state the capacity to isolate and identify *groups* and *bodies* of individuals deemed to be threats to the wellbeing of the surrounding population.⁶⁸ As discussed previously, the United States government has been actively pursuing social media actors with requests on specific information on tens of thousands of foreigners. Although it would be difficult to stipulate that these thousands are indeed categorized as national security threats, the point is that the state attempts to cross-identify characteristics within these groups and bodies in order to identify who is/is not threatening. For example, *Twitter* facilitated the Department of State's ability to communicate with Syrians during a surge in violence in early February 2012 that tanks were moving in on Syrian cities and that a subsequent pipeline fire was spreading toxic fumes, all of which was made available by U.S. satellites.⁶⁹ It appears that the U.S. has played in an instrumental role in protecting *Syrians* from impending danger. Through the monitoring of Syria, including its surrounding geophysical area and the activities of its people, the U.S. acts in the name of the 'right', liberal democratic 'thing to do'. *Facebook* also played an instrumental role in this scenario as U.S. Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, posted the aforementioned satellite imagery on *Facebook* for Syrians to take note.⁷⁰ The most important aspect of all of this is not just that the state effectively employed biopolitics via these social media technologies, but the information compiled in the name of Syrians' wellbeing facilitated the evacuation of American

⁶⁸ Michael Dillon and Julian Reid. *The Liberal War of War: Killing to Make Life Live*. (Routledge) February, 2009, 79-85.

⁶⁹ NPR News, *Twitter Diplomacy: State Department 2.0*. [Homepage of NPR News][Online]. Available: <http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2012/02/21/147207004/twitter-diplomacy-state-department-2-0>

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

staff from the U.S. Embassy in Damascus. The point to bear in mind here are the U.S.' securitization interests at play in the backdrop; social media technologies are often articulated by news media as tools for international diplomacy, yet the Department of State is also actively involved in employing social media technologies for distinctively national security-oriented initiatives, whereby it requested *Google* to reveal any and all personal information it had on over 14,000 non-American foreigners in 2011.⁷¹

SECTION TWO

As stated in the introduction, the paper seeks to contribute some theories and methods of International Political Sociology for the ways in which they provide compelling accounts of certain sociopolitical phenomena, especially but not limited to those concerning the intersection of public and private actors. Where this chapter continues this contribution is by further demonstrating the application of these theories and methods specifically with regards to discourses on the relatively unclear nature of governance. Accordingly, chapter five articulates how many of the previous chapters' discussions can be further explored\(\re)read to reveal a host of problematizations involved in attempts to delineate with certainty that the U.S. maintains complete control over foreign policy when social media becomes involved. In particular, the chapters on governmentality, the foreign policy assemblage, and (bio)political power will be explored. Chapter six, "Social Media's Political Space", will contribute one final theoretical, conceptual account of how foreign policy's lines of governance become blurred via the inclusion of social media actors and their respective technologies.

⁷¹ Google, Transparency Report 2011. [Homepage of Google][Online]. Available: <http://www.google.com/transparencyreport/governmentrequests/>

V: The 'Blurring' of Who\What Governs Foreign Policy

A. Governmentality

The second chapter's discussion of governmentality demonstrated the ways in which it highlights the extents of the state's involvement in daily life and how it is willing to utilize previously unexplored methods, locales and techniques for governing. This chapter seeks to employ governmentality to demonstrate the ways in which governance does not require the state in order to occur. Governmentality has been employed across various disciplines and within various discourses because of the ways in which it examines questions of governance as something that happens *between* subjects as well. This attempt to read governance deeper, beyond the primacy of the state, is an important aspect of governmentality especially because it is keeping with its commitment to interrogate the state. Governmentality was not simply conceptualized by Foucault to assist in understanding how the state comes to be intimately involved in so many facets of daily life, but to provide students of political science a toolkit for realizing the state's limitations as well. This is indeed an important aspect for this paper because it demonstrates that the state's willingness to utilize any and all means available to control its subjects is not always successful and subsequently contributes to the blurring of the lines of who/what governs foreign policy when private actors become involved. This section turns to the work of Rose in Powers of Freedom to demonstrate the ways in which governance occurs without the state and will conclude by demonstrating how the removal of the state implicates who/what governs foreign policy.

Concerning the 'how' aspects of governance, Rose's work asks: when governing takes place, *who* and *what* governs?⁷² It is from this question that curiosities arise regarding the extent to which governance can occur between subjects and without the state and its various ligaments. Rose argues that governance is achieved via processes of reconstituting the mentalities underpinning individual's thought processes. In other words, when individuals interact, via discussion, deliberation, argument, debate or plea, they are necessarily engaging in a process of attempting to change an individual's mentalities. The implication here is not just that an individual is attempting to convince another to change their thought processes to work in agreement with those of their interacting counterpart. Rather, the implication is much deeper than thought-processes and specifically concerns *mentalities* thereof. Mentalities can be understood as the generic processes of thought themselves that are not necessarily guided by any systematic means of impression.⁷³ An individual's mentalities are constituted by a blending of various knowledges, beliefs and opinions acquired throughout their lifetime that did not necessarily come to be via conscious thinking. Mentalities are not usually open to questioning, because they are relatively taken for granted aspects of thinking. The important point here is that between the various mentalities constituting individuals' thoughts, the majority of them are constituted by *governance*. For example, an individual does not simply 'think' that being honest is a 'good' thing to do throughout their existence, but rather that this *mentality* underpins her/his thought-processes and is affected perhaps by her/his parents, neighbors, partners, friends, and so on throughout the course of her/his lifetime. The consequence of this impression upon her/his rationale is the belief that telling the truth and not lying is something that should and ought to be achieved, and so, the individual governs her/his own behavior accordingly. What makes this

⁷² Nikolas Rose. *Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought*. (Cambridge University Press), 1999, 145-51.

⁷³ *Ibid.*

understanding of governance particularly important is that when we 'think' about governing, especially with regards to the ways in 'we' govern 'ourselves', the lines between *who* and *what* governs becomes extremely blurry. What is happening when one 'thinks' about governing? From what specific mentalities are they drawing upon, and where in turn were these mentalities affected? The logics forwarded by governmentality suggest that it is extremely difficult to trace who or what governs behavior. On the one hand, certain technologies, visibilities, mentalities and laws of the state can be traced and relatively discerned as having an immediate impact upon the behavior, beliefs, comportment, thoughts and overall identity of individuals. On the other hand, the multiplicity of interactions between individuals suggests that people constantly impress upon one another competing accounts of what is a 'proper' or perhaps 'appropriate' form of behavior or conduct. Accordingly, and as prescribed by various writers of governmentality⁷⁴, many cases exist where an analysis of governance often becomes problematized by the simultaneous identification of *governing* and *governed* individuals/subjects as aspects of the same actor or group. In other words, when one 'thinks' about a governance puzzle, such as in the case of the relationship between the state and social media actors, it also makes attempts to specifically identify the state as the sole executor of foreign policy governance extremely difficult.

B. The 'Foreign Policy Assemblage'

The concept of assemblage is important to this paper and for two reasons. Initially, it provided an alternative framework for understanding foreign policy in order to make sense of how social media can be related to the state with regards to its international commitments to

⁷⁴ Mitchell Dean. *Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society* 2nd edition. (London: Sage Publications), 2009, 44-7.

national interest and national security. Secondly, and most importantly, it is the decentralizing emphasis of the concept itself that makes it extremely difficult to say with certainty that foreign policy is somehow a practice completely governed by the state.

An important factor contributing to the blurring of foreign policy's lines of governance is the decentralizing emphasis within the concept of assemblage itself. This can be traced by acknowledging an important methodological emphasis behind Haggerty and Ericson's discussion of assemblage, of which compels their readers to refrain from attempting to identify a single source as to who or what drives the assemblage. Rather, the idea is to focus upon the interactions between the actors and objects that constitute assemblages themselves as doing the driving. By looking beyond the surface level of the relationship between the state and social media is to uncover a host of activities, actions processes and practices emerging by virtue of the state and social media actors interacting around the globe. This constant interaction between multiple subjects and objects, such as the state, social media actors, mobile technologies and their users, makes possible this plethora of practices and processes. But to determine and identify *all* of these objects and subjects, as well as what interactions they are responsible for with certainty, is virtually impossible. What all of this implies than is that the outcomes or results of an assemblage cannot be explained by virtue of the efforts of one particular subject or object, such as the state. For example, the monitoring of foreign populations cannot be reduced to the efforts of the state and its technological capacities within its immediate purview. It has necessarily come to rely upon the capabilities of social media technologies in order to do so. To take this observation deeper is to identify a virtually network of social interactions between the technologies, its users and the actors that tend to control them. Many questions are raised accordingly: to what extent can this network of interaction be entirely understood, organized and

utilized for strictly security, surveillance, entertainment, profit or governance interests? Who or what controls this network of interaction? The users, the actors or the technologies? Can the input and output of these interactions and where they come from be objectively traced? While many of these questions appear virtually impossible to answer with certainty, the point is that the state cannot possibly be their sole answer. Rather, the foreign policy assemblage should be understood as indeed achieving a host of ends and objectives that align with the aforementioned interests, but it is the competition of interests involved that steers the direction and subsequent practices of the assemblage itself. From this logic, the practices and processes that constitute the foreign policy assemblage can only be understood as having incommensurable levels of input/output from unidentifiable digital and geophysical locales. The only subsequent argument that can be made with certainty is that who or what governs foreign policy when private actors are so intimately involved is uncertain.

C. Bio(Political) Power

A critical discussion of political power takes its cue from a deeper academic commitment underpinning Foucault's genealogy of the state's employment political powers, as discussed in chapter five. This commitment concerns Foucault's examination the free-flowing nature of political power, of which services as a second substantial factor contributing to the blurring of the lines of foreign policy's governance each and every time social media actors and their technologies become involved. Why Foucault's discussion is particularly important is because it raises questions which challenge the extent to which the state's willingness to employ biopower vis-à-vis social media technologies can realized. This section begins by discussing Foucault's

analysis of the operational nature of political power and follows by examining how his discussion raises a series of questions that challenge the state's capacity to employ biopower.

In chapter four, Foucault's lectures at the College de France were drawn upon because it was during these sessions that he articulated his genealogy of the state's relationship to political power, with specific emphasis placed upon how the state manipulated political power to evolve into three specific methods of control: sovereign power, disciplinary power, and biopower. However, this was not the extent of Foucault's discussions of political power during these lectures. Foucault was also concerned with demonstrating to his audience that the state's employment of political power was but a manipulation thereof. In other words, Foucault was educating his audience as to the ways in which political power is not something that exists *only* within the state's control; political power can be harnessed and exercised between individuals as well. Foucault believed political power to be everywhere, flowing in between subjects rather than simply deposited upon them with no further movement or consequence thereof.⁷⁵ Foucault identified for his audience that the execution of political power is more or less a process of governance, particularly concerned with attempts to dominate individuals' behavior. However, Foucault was not concerned with associating domination with the state's control over one individual or of groups of individuals, but of the "multiple forms of domination that can be exercised in society... not the king in his central position, but subjects in their reciprocal relations; not sovereignty in its one edifice, but the multiple subjugations that place and function within the social body."⁷⁶ This notion of domination between subjects, or of the flow of political power between them, is reminiscent of this chapter's previous discussion on governmentality. The notion of 'subjects in their reciprocal relations' and of the 'multiple subjugations that exist

⁷⁵ Foucault, Michel. *Society Must Be Defended*. (New York: Picador), 1997, 26-7.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*

within the social body' can be understood as individuals in their attempt to govern one another. But the most important point to take from this is that the process of governing itself depends upon the flow of political power in order to make governance between subjects possible. In other words, and for example, as individual 'A' attempts to convince individual 'B' that her/his belief about a particular subject matter requires change, individual 'A' executes political power over individual 'B' in order to do so. What this process articulates than is that political power can indeed be executed laterally between subjects as opposed to mere linear execution by the state. Accordingly, what Foucault prescribed for audience was a particular characteristic concerning the nature of political power, of which concerns the ways in which political power 'moves'. Foucault suggested that political power ought to be analyzed as "something that circulates, or rather, as something that functions only when it is part of a chain. It is never localized here or there, it is never in the hands of some... Power is exercised through networks, and individuals do not simply circulate in those networks; they are its relays... power passes through individuals... It is not applied to them."⁷⁷

From this observation, questions are raised concerning the extent to which the state's willingness to act through social media technologies for biopolitical purposes can be realized. If, for example, political power can be conceptualized as flowing between subjects, than what happens to it after biopower is applied through social media technologies? By taking heed to Foucault's observation that 'political power is not applied to [them] individuals' and that it rather 'passes through them', where does it further proceed? If it is conceived as *circulating*, does it does so back to the state, thus effectively reinforcing its biopolitical tendencies? As discussed earlier with regards to the FDNS monitoring foreigners as they apply for citizenship, it is quite

⁷⁷ Ibid, 29.

clear that the state is in effect keeping tabs on who or what poses a security threat. Not only is the individual of concern monitored, but FDNS agents are indeed compelled to keep tabs on the activities of others that the individual of concern had interacted with as well. What this scenario paints is an application of biopower whereby the state slowly yet gradually builds databases on specific populations and groups thereof. When this information collection is combined with, for example, *Google's* releasing of information to the state on specific persons of concern, *Facebook's* as well as *Twitter's* data collection capacities, the case for this process of data collection continues to enlarge. A consequence of this logic is that the state appears to be applying political power directly towards specific populations and groups with little to no repercussion, hence this section's concern. If 'overall domination is not something that is pluralized and then has repercussions down below'⁷⁸, what are the repercussions and where can they be articulated, especially with regards to implications against the state?

These questions are important because they create the opportunity through which debate can emerge regarding the extent to which the state's application of (bio)political power is without hindrance or consequence. In other words, the questions themselves make room to challenge who/what governs foreign policy because Foucault's discussion of the nature of political power's challenges the extent to which the state enjoys the employment of biopower without resistance or consequence. To continue adding salt to the wound, the final segment of this chapter attempts to provide one possible, theoretical answer to these questions, of which specifically concerns the concentration of political powers within the immediate purview of social media technologies and their users. If heed is given to Foucault's identification with the ways in which individuals are 'in a position to both submit to and exercise [this] power' then social media's political space

⁷⁸ Ibid.

becomes an important domain to consider for the concentration of political powers, especially because they are concentrated and (re)directed against state control.

VI: Social Media's Political Space

This final segment of the chapter seeks to provide a final concept which entails a domain of political power concentrated within the purview of social media users for the purposes of resisting state control. Magnusson's concept of 'political space' in The Search for Political Space is one of IPS' most influential contributions explaining sociopolitical phenomena without the centrality of the state and as such fits this paper's second objective with regards to employing IPS' theories and methods in order to problematize sociopolitical phenomena. The discussion to follow will begin by drawing discussing Magnusson's concept of 'political space' in three aspects, followed by using these three aspects to render social media's political space. Of utmost importance is the third aspect of the political space(s) because it is necessarily concerns juxtaposition to state control and as such tremendously confounds foreign policy's lines of governance. Before continuing, a forewarning regarding Magnusson's work. His discussion of 'space' does not align with Newtonian assumptions of spatiality and temporality.⁷⁹ In other words, the reader should avoid the impulse to *see* space as something geophysically definable and subsequently locatable on a map. Rather, the point is to conceptualize an abstract, conceptual domain relating to, involving and having the *nature* of space. Space ought to be understood as an expanse constantly and simultaneously (un)occupied by the constant movement/transmission of objects, activities, and individuals. There is no 'absolute' space per se, it is a theoretical obstacle the state faces when it attempts to act through social media technologies.

⁷⁹ Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Experience. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press), 1999, 5.

The concept of 'political space' concerns the emergence of abstract domain , a consequent phenomenon of young people in urban and municipal locales protesting state oppression and political violence. Accordingly, the first critical analytical feature of political space is that people, vis-à-vis ongoing interaction, create these spaces and that the nature of their emergence means they are not geographically fixated.⁸⁰ The sorts of interactions referred to are political actions, such as public displays, protests, organized gatherings/meetings, voting, rallying, and so on. This is not to say, however, that these actions superimpose a geographically locatable/definable area or 'space' per se, but rather, that these actions facilitate the emergence of an abstract domain through which political powers can be concentrated to affect change in a state's governance. For Magnusson, this conceptualization of political space is particularly compelling because it is not bound to the specific geographical locations of public displays and protests.

The second feature concerns the way in which the emergence of various political spaces facilitates their confluence, effectively enlarging and concentrating their effects for mutual benefit. As protests and organized displays take place around the globe, irrespective of where they may happen to be, they have the effect of influencing one another. For example, consider the ways in which the university and college protests across the United States in the 1970s necessarily grew, inspired and came to incorporate and cross-identify with various other social demonstrations across both the United States itself and Western Europe, all of which came to articulate a collective concern with New Leftist mentalities of governance across Western liberal democracies.⁸¹ What the example articulates in particular is the ways in which political power

⁸⁰ Ibid, 13.

⁸¹ Ibid, 18.

began locally and flowed between various municipalities and cities across the globe to the benefit protestors' causes irrespective of where they are.

The third and perhaps most important analytical feature of political space is its juxtaposition to the state. The day-to-day activities across political spaces, especially but not limited to those of resistance, as aforementioned, are necessarily concerned with challenging state control. Although many states have demonstrated intolerances with regards to organized protest, especially to those which actively seek to challenge the state's legitimacy, political space remains is intended as conceptualization of domain where politics and political power can exist without the state's involvement or dependency thereof. With that said, the concept of political space is first and foremost concerned with articulating a domain a mode of state resistance.

From the aforementioned a specific conceptualization of a political space for social media may ensue and will be explained in three parts. While they explain what social media's political space is and what it entails, the third characteristic specifically concerns the concept's juxtaposition to state control and as such becomes the single most important feature contributing to the blurring of the lines of foreign policy's governance. It should be noted beforehand, however, that a limitation of Magnusson's work is that it does not articulate the transmission of localized, regional protest *online*. More simply, the involvement of communication technologies adds another dimension to the concept of political space that Magnusson's initial discussion does not consider. Accordingly, his concept is expanded to consider the ways in which social media technologies themselves facilitate the emergence of a political space. The slipperiness behind expanding his concept is such that there are indeed implications with these technologies' ownership. They tend to be directly controlled by the private actors who produce, manage and promote them and so the extent to which corporate involvement implicates the emergence of a

political space is a limitation of applying Magnusson's concept to social networking technologies as much as it is a critical blind spot of this paper. Nevertheless, the conceptualizing of social media's political space begins by accounting for the emergence of various political spaces across the Arab world.

Since December 2010, many violent protests erupted in the streets of Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria amongst many others.⁸² A crucial aspect of these protests is that many of them began by virtue of electronic communication via social media technologies.⁸³ The first and foremost important analytical feature of social media's political space concerns electronic interaction. Specifically speaking, the digital, cellular and internet based interaction between users of social media technologies, as well as the actors that tend to control them, across a host of local and regional experiences of state repression.

The second feature of social media's political space concerns a slight conceptual departure from Magnusson, in that individuals protesting state repression are not so simply locatable across physical geographies. While Magnusson emphasizes the ways in which political spaces emerge locally and grow by virtue of their mutual identification with other similarly aligned movements around the globe, social media's political space emerges by virtue of the immediate and material interconnectivity of social media users irrespective of their geographical location. This is primarily because their geographical location, in many instances, cannot be determined nor ascertained with certainty. While it can be argued that many of them are locatable perhaps, in Tehran Square, it is the speed and scale at which their political expressions become immediately and intimately interactive with friends, family members and observers

⁸² The Economist, Arab Spring: Who lost Egypt? [Homepage of The Economist][Online]. Available: http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2011/03/arab_spring

⁸³ Phillip N. Howard, Muzammil M. Hussain, The Role of Digital Media, in the Journal of Democracy 22(30), July 2011. (John Hopkins University Press), 2011, 3-5.

anywhere around the globe that is of primary focus. The *search* for social media's political space emphasizes the ways in which social media's political space is less concerned with geophysical location, and more concerned with forwarding an international political sociology of electronic spatiality as a host domain for the organization of political power. In other words, social media's political space is capable of permeating locales of physical protest and consequently transmitting and articulating their messages *online*.

The third and most important analytical feature of social media's political space aligns directly with Magnusson's identifications specifically concern juxtaposition to state control. Since the demonstrations across the Arab world began, social media technologies have been crucial to their organization, communication and enlargement. An important characteristic of many of these digital interactions are their grievances with state repression and control. The demonstrations, marches, strikes and rallies on the streets were communicated to the world, as well as to other social media users in different sites of protest, largely sought to raise awareness of state repression. Interestingly enough, many of the states that these sites were demonstrating against either attempted to or successfully deactivated Internet access throughout the country.⁸⁴ This was done largely to prevent protestors from encouraging other sites of protest and communicating with the world their experiences especially with regards to state violence. Mobile, cellular devices that piggy-backed cellular networks became crucial communication technologies, through which social media software projected protestors' voices across the globe. What emerged is the utility and consequent recognition of social media technologies as a medium for political expression, particularly of the sorts concerned with state censorship and

⁸⁴ CAIDA, Analysis of Country-wide Internet Outages Caused by Censorship. [Homepage of the Cooperative Association for Internet Data][Online]. Available: http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2011/outages_censorship/outages_censorship.pdf

violence. Accordingly, social media's political space is necessarily characterized as one opposed to state control.

The political space encompassing social media actors and their respective technologies serves as a third factor contributing to the blurring of the lines of governance within foreign policy. What is important understand here is that as the state acts through social media technologies, it is necessarily permeating a political space dominated by things other than the state itself. In other words, the state enters a domain completely outside of its immediate purview and as such is subject to a plethora of phenomena it is unable to control. This is not to say that the employment of social media technologies is somehow a fallacy, or perhaps that the technologies themselves are not capable of being utilized as a biotechnology for surveillance and security purposes. The point is that while this sort of control is happening, the political powers flowing throughout social media's political space tend to escape state manipulation and consequently implicates that the extent to which social media technologies can indeed be utilized to the extent that the state desires. In other words, the state's pursuit of these technologies is successful, but a degree, and this is largely by virtue of the ways in which political powers within social media's political space escape state control. There are a few ways this can be understood theoretically, and the first begins with social media's electronic characteristics. In Magnusson's discussions of political space, he explores the ways in which the emergence of political spaces, specifically with regards to protest against state control, begin locally and expand globally. In essence, political power may be located initially, but its flow permeates sites of local protest around the globe thus necessarily binding many protests within a collective spatial auspice. A characteristic feature of political space than is the way in which political power binds and unites individuals seeking political expression, irrespective of where they are. Where social media's

political space not only adopts this characteristic, it tends to take it further. As discussed in earlier, a crucial characteristic of social media's political space is its detachment from geophysical locales. While communications are, as a matter of speaking, localized at their point of inception, they become incorporeal transmissions across virtual spaces. Although the state attempts to govern the internet, virtual spaces are not entirely governed spaces per se.⁸⁵ Although it has been demonstrated that the state utilizes its sovereign and legal apparatuses to govern social media actors in accordance to security threats, this simply cannot be done abroad. At best, and as discussed previously, the state makes 'requests' to social media actors on foreigners abroad. The subsequent and most important observation here is that with a lack of legal oversight with regards to virtual domains in general, social media's political space effectively escapes the immediate purview of the state, thus denoting a relatively unhindered and unmitigated flow of political expression and political power. This is not to say that virtual spaces are strictly ungoverned; social media actors and internet service provides play instrumental roles in how social media content is transmitted and regulated. The point here is that the state does not wield an discernible and absolute control of social media technologies across virtual spaces, thus suggesting that social media technologies, their users and the actors that tend to control them, problematize what it is that foreign policy can actually achieve 'online'; foreign policy articulations, implementations and subsequent practices are as much at the mercy of social media as they are at the state's bidding.

⁸⁵ Daniel W. Drezner, The Global Governance of the Internet: Bringing the State Back In, in *Political Science Quarterly* (119)3, 2004, 480-4.

VII: Conclusion

Given the rates at which social media technologies continue to penetrate global populations, the likelihood that the U.S. will continue pursuing social media actors for purposes of surveillance, and for the advancement of biopolitical management, is likely to increase. If the proliferation of domestic cases demonstrating the state's interest in social media is not compelling enough, consider that even with U.S. armed forces withdrawing from Afghanistan between 2012 and 2014, coupled with the absence of many embassies and troops on the ground across various sites of the sociopolitical turmoil encompassing many states across the Middle East and Africa, the Obama administration has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to investing in the national defense industry. The current percentage of national revenue dedicated to defense contracts is higher than the previous fiscal year, and is projected to be even higher in 2013.⁸⁶ The amount of national revenue dedicated to the defense industry is higher than it was when George W. Bush was in office.⁸⁷ Of particular concern is where these funds are being allocated, such as in the development of border and surveillance technologies, as well as *cyber-security*.⁸⁸ As it appears, the U.S.' commitment to quelling/constructing national security threats is as focused as it was in the years immediately following 11 September 2001. Materially speaking, this paper foresees the consequent enlargement of the foreign policy bureaucracy's apparent commitment to working through social media actors and their respective technologies abroad. But this does not imply that the state will indeed be 'successful' in achieving its tasks.

⁸⁶ Homeland Security, Secretary Napolitano Announces Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request, February 13, 2012 [Homepage of Homeland Security][Online]. Available: <http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/20120213-fy-2013-budget-request.shtm>

⁸⁷ The Examiner, Obama has spent more than Bush and infinitely more than Eisenhower, May 26, 2012 [Homepage of The Examiner][Online]. Available: <http://www.examiner.com/article/obama-spends-more-than-bush-and-infinitely-more-than-eisenhower>

⁸⁸ Ibid.

The relationship between the state and social media is a complex arrangement, of which subsequently operates by virtue of the coalescing of interests for control, governance, security, surveillance, profit and entertainment. In keeping with this paper's intellectual identification with International Political Sociology, a commitment at performance throughout the paper is to highlight the state in all of its specter and awe, and then problematize its efforts in order to make room for political life to exist without preaching some notion of the state's inevitable successes. Rather, the paper seeks to suggest that the more the state works through political life outside of its immediate domain, such as through private actors abroad, who and what tends to govern foreign policy becomes increasingly 'blurred'. The 'blurring' of foreign policy's lines of governance can perhaps be read as a consequence of the nature of inquiry behind IPS, whereas other disciplinary trajectories may produce dramatically different outcomes with regards to how foreign policy is/is not effected, or perhaps who\what is understood as driving the relationship between social media actors and the state. As a matter of speaking, this paper's conclusion is specifically in tandem with its intellectual commitment and as such is of little use to individuals interested in joining the foreign policy service or the weapons procurement industry. This paper was written with students of American Studies, international politics and IPS in mind. Within a disciplinary field such as American Studies, a multitude of theories and methods are available for those seeking to understand 'America', U.S. politics and political life accordingly. The field has changed dramatically since the time of its emergence and since the early 1990s, an increasing emphasis has been placed upon post-modern commitments, specifically ones which seek to challenge and deconstruct understandings of 'America' rather than privilege them otherwise. Perhaps it is by virtue of this disciplinary commitment with American Studies that this paper comfortably cross-identifies with IPS. Nevertheless, there is much critical merit in promoting

academic endeavors that encourage hesitation and subsequent interrogation in order to reveal a plethora of social processes at play beneath the surface of any sociopolitical observation. For it is within the production of singular accounts that promote objective certainties and outcomes, that the subsequent marginalization of what politics 'is' and what it entails prevents politics from being politics as such: a site of contestation.⁸⁹ The paper encourages students of American Studies to take heed to this paper's obvious advocacy of IPS when exploring sociopolitical phenomena for in doing so will, at the very least, reveal the extremely rich and complicated nature of social interact and produce some 'healthy' academic discomfort.

⁸⁹ Judith Butler, *Contingent Foundations: Feminism and the Question of "Postmodernism"*, in *Praxis International* 11 (July 1991), 158-63.

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